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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

UTAH HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY,

•:

Plaintiff-Respondent,
~VS
HERBERT L. SMART, Director
of Finance of the State of
Utah, and DAVID SMITH MONSON,
Auditor of the State of Utah,
Defendants-Appellants.

m

Case NO.
14924

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Third
District Court granting a declaratory judgment and mandamus
to the plaintiff (Respondent).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Respondent filed a complaint against the appellants
alleging the constitutionality of the Utah Housing Finance
Agency Act and seeking a writ of mandamus that appellants
approve the appropriation of funds and issue a warrant for the
dispersal of such funds pursuant to said Act.
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The court declared the Act to be constitutional
and ordered the appellants to approve and issue funds
pursuant to the act.
- RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal of the judgment
of the Third Judicial District Court.
• '••''•

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In 1975 the Utah Legislature passed the Utah
Housing Finance Agency Act (hereafter, "Act"), L. 1975,
ch. 190, codified as Utah Code Ann. § 63~44a~l, et. seq.
(Supp. 1975) (hereafter all statutory references are to Utah
Code Annotated (Supp. 1975).

The Act creates the Utah

Housing Finance Agency, a body corporate and politic of the
State, Respondent herein, (hereafter "Agency'1).

It has

the power to sue and be sued.

§§ 63-44a-3, 63-44a~9.

Generally, the Act creates an

Agency composed of state

officials and public members appointed by the Governor, upon
whom are conferred powers

to deal with the problems of an

inadequate supply of decent, safe, sanitary housing for
persons of low and moderate income in Utah by increasing
the availability of mortgage funds for such housing.
§ 63-44a~2.

-2-
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The Act permits the Agency to obtain funds by
the sale of notes and bonds and other obligations*
§§ 63*~44a~~9, 63-44a~ll.

Such notes and bonds, income

therefrom, and payments thereon, together with all
agency property, are exempt from taxation,

§ 63-44a-16.

The Agency is then commanded to make such tax exempt funds
available on a low interest basis for the financing of the
purchase, construction, or rehabilitation of housing for
low and moderate income persons,

§§ 63-44a~9, 63-44a-10.

The Agency may adopt a number of techniques
for making its funds available.

It may make direct loans

through qualified mortgage lenders to individuals for
purchase, construction, or rehabilitation of housing.
§ 63-44a-10 (1),(2).

It may create a housing rehabilitation

fund for direct loans for rehabilitation of low and moderate
income housing,

§ 63~44a~!0 (4). It may make loans to

local housing authorities for purchase or construction of
low and moderate income housing.

§ 63-44a-10 (5). It may

purchase loans from qualified mortgage lenders, providing
that the funds paid the lender by the Agency will be used
by the lender to make low interest mortgages to low and
moderate income persons as defined by the Agency,

§ 63~44a-6,

Presently, the Agency is in the process of
finalizing rules and regulations for the implementation of

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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its initial program*

It desires to make an initial sale

of bonds in order to obtain funds to be used to purchr;-.:--e
mortgages, and has undertaken preparations for such a
sale*

See the Affidavit of William G. Bruhn

(R.183).

At the time of passage of the Act, the
legislature appropriated to the Agency the sum of $200,000
to be used to establish a general operating fund and $300,000
to establish a capital reserve fund.
1975, Ch. 190, §20.

See Laws of Utah

The Agency has requested that this

sum be disbursed to. it from the State Treasury, to be
used to cover initial expenses and to implement its
initial program.

See the Agency's Resolution and Voucher

attached to the Complaint*

Defendants Herbert L. Smart,

State Director of Finance and David Smith Monson, State
Auditor, refused to take any steps to process the request
of the Agency for funds because of substantial questions
of the constitutionality of the Act.
The Agency filed an action for declaratory
judgment and mandamus to have the Act declared constitutional and to require the appellants to take necessary
steps for the dispersal of state funds.

The Third Judicial

District Court, Judge Bryant H. Croft, presiding, granted
the Agency's requested relief and appellants brought their
appeal.

-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I

[

THE UTAH HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY ACT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT LENDS STATE CREDIT IN AID
OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL PURPOSES.
Article VI, section 29 of the Utah Constitution prohibits lending state credit for private
purposes:
"The Legislature shall not
authorize the State, or any
county/ city, town, township,
district or other political subdivision of the State to lend
its credit or subscribe to stock
or bonds in aid of any railroad,
telegraph or other private individual or corporate enterprise
or undertaking."
Most states have either a similar provision
in their constitution or other provisions designed to
restrict the expenditure of public funds where they aid
private interests.

These provisions have been .interpreted

many times, but frequently it is difficult to apply one
court decision to another situation because the decisions
involve slightly different constitutional provisions,
a balancing of public and private benefit unique to each
case, and different interpretations of the phrase "lending
of credit."

"Lending of credit" may involve the mere

-5-
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expenditures of funds or it may imply going into debt.
Such lendi i of credit does not aid private interests
if the animating purpose of the transaction is for the
dominant benefit of the state even though private
interests may incidentally benefit from it.

The

definition of lending credit and aiding private interests
must both be considered.
•"A. The Act Unconstitutionally Requires The
State To "Lend Its Credit" Because Funds Are Appropriated
And Debts Are Incurred.
The courts appear to differ somewhat in their
interpretation of the phrase "lending of credit."

One

line of cases holds that there is no loaning of credit
unless a financial liability is imposed on the state.
This interpretation is typified by the Idaho Supreme
Courtfs statement in Nelson v. Marshall, 94 Idaho 7 26,
497 P.2d 47 (1972):
"[The loaning of credit clause
of article 8, section 2] prohibits
only loaning of the State's credit,
Idaho Const, art. 8, § 2 , does not
prohibit the loaning of State funds.
The word 'credit1 as used in this provision implied the imposition of some
new financial liability upon the State
which in effect results in the creation
of State debt for the benefit of
private enterprises. This was the
evil intended to be remedied by
Idaho Const, art. 8, § 2, and similar

-6
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•" .

provisions in other state constitutions. Yet that particular
evil is not presented by the investment of existing funds of the
State, for no new State debts are
created by such action."
Another line of cases holds that the appropriation

of state funds constitutes a "lending of credit.11

The

case of Button v. Day, 208 Va. 494, 158 S.E. 2d 735 (1968),
involving an Industrial Building Authority Act, typifies
this point of view:
"It cannot be gainsaid that
stimulation of the development of
industry is a public purpose warranting
governmental participation to achieve
the desired object of creating
additional employment for the citizens
of the State. It does not follow,
however, that because the goal is
meritorious, every method which might,
in some way, aid its accomplishment is
therefore constitutionally permissible;
or, to put it another way, that because
the purpose is public, anything done in
furtherance thereof becomes, a fortiori,
a proper governmental function.
The Act before us is stamped indelibly
with the purpose of granting credit in aid
of private interests upon the faith of
State funds—the precise thing the Constitution says shall not be a proper
function of government. Granting credit
with State funds is the sole, quickening
function of the Authority, the very core
of its existence. To withhold the use of
State funds or to withdraw the power to
grant credit would unavoidably bring about
the early demise of the whole scheme.
We have noted with interest and given
attention to the Attorney General's argument that there is no extension of credit
involved in a 'one shot1 appropriation of
cash unattended by an obligation to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

appropriate further funds. In a
proper case, that might be a valid
argument. We know here, however, that
any money that is appropriated by the
legislature to the guaranty fund, whether .
initially or in subsequent appropriation
acts, is to be used, by the express terms
of the Act, for nothing but the granting
of credit, and that simply is unconstitutionally impermissible.
We have not overlooked our rule that,
in determining whether there has been a
violation of the credit clause, we look
to the animating purpose of a public
transaction to see if it is for the dominant
benefit of the State* But unlike any other
case which we have had before us, there is
inherent in the operation of the Authority
and to the use of the guaranty fund the
fact, expressed in the Act, that the debts
to be guaranteed by the Authority and to
be discharged with State money from the
guaranty fund upon default, are otherwise
unobtainable loans secured from private
sources by private firms to finance construction or improvement of privately
owned industrial plants. In such a
situation, it is difficult, if not wellnigh impossible, to say that the benefit
to private interests is merely incidental
or, conversely, that the benefit to the
State is paramount."
This Court has adopted the viewpoint expressed
in Button v. Day, i.e., the appropriation of

State funds,

as well as the incurring of a liability, constitute a lending
of credit within the purview of Article VI, Section 29,
of the Constitution.

In Utah State Land Board v. Utah State

Finance Commission, 12 U.2d 265, 365 P.2d 213 (1961), the
court discussed the arguments made in the Constitutional

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Convention concerning the provision and then stated:
"It appears from the argument
and provisions adopted that the advisability of investing in stocks
and bonds was considered, and that
the Convention only had as its object the prevention of the use of
State funds or credit "in aid ol any
railroad, telegraph or other private
individual or corporate enterprise or
undertaking.
The provision fin aid of any
railroad1 etc. was expressly intended to prevent the use of the finances
of the State to give support to private
interests or enterprises. . . . "
With respect to the Act, it provides that the
Agency may issue revenue bonds but that

the faith and credit

of the State or any of its political subdivisions may not
be pledged to their payment.

§ 63-44a~15.

The Act pro-

vides that in the event the capital reserve fund falls below its required level, the Agency may certify to the
Governor the amount needed to. restore the capital reserve
and that the Legislature may appropriate the needed funds
which shall be repaid to the General Fund from moneys in
excess of the amount required to keep the Agency selfsupporting.

§ 63~44a~12 (1) (f).

It also provides that the

Agency, among other things, may receive gifts or grants
from any department or agency of the State.

§ 63-44a-9(j).

It provides for an appropriation of $300,000 to establish
the capital reserve fund, which amount shall be repaid to

-9-
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the General Fund within ten years from revenues generated •
by the Agency; and it provides for an appropriation
of $200,000 to establish the mortgage guarantee fundf
which amount shall be paid to the General Fund within tet.\
years from revenues generated by the Agency.
There are a number of recent cases in which
constitutionality of housing finance acts somewhat similar
to the Act have been upheld.

In some of these cases, the

act provided that the agency would certify to the governor
the amount of money needed to keep the reserve funds intact
and provided that the legislature could appropriate the
needed funds.

However, in the holdings that the "lending

of credit" clause was not violated, it should be noted
that the courts were among those that have interpreted
the "lending of credit" to mean the creation of a liability
on the part of the state rather than including the
appropriation of public funds.

In these cases, the courts

stated that the provision that the legislature may
appropriate funds did not create a liability.

See Johnson

v. Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency, 4 53 Pa. 329, 3 09
A.2d 528 (1973), and the cases cited therein.
Thus it appears that Utah does not accept a
narrow view of the prohibition against the lending of
credit.

A single appropriation for private uses, and is

present here, violates the Constitution.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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But in fact there is not only a single
appropriation because the Act imposes long range liabilities,
albeit contingent, on future legislatures.

It is suggested

that the necessity for future fueling by the legislature
is permissive only and does not amount to an obligation
or liability.

In many respects, however, this argument

is merely a matter of semantics by which the true intent
of the Constitution would be avoided.

As a matter of fiscal

necessity and practical reality, any future default in
obligations by the agency would be brought

to the attention

of the Governor who would "invite" the legislature to
remedy the situation to preserve the credit and good

name

of the State of Utah.
The single appropriation of funds for private
purposes constitutes "lending credit" under Utah law, but
even under the most restrictive, definition of "lending
credit" the implied obligation for future funding inherent
in the Act creates future debt or liabilities on the State
on which purchasers of bonds will rely, basing such decisions
in part on the credit worthiness of the State of Utah.
Therefore, the Act violates the Utah constitutional
provisionss, Article VI,. section 29.
B.

The Act Unconstitutionally Requires The

State To Aid Private Individual Enterprises Or Undertakings
Because It Primarily Benefits Private Rather Than Public
Interests.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It is not possible to state an exact
definition of "public purpose" as it is subject to
change, with changing circumstances, Walker v. Alaska
State Mortgage Association, 416 P.2d 245 (Alaska 1966).
Furthermore, the fact that private, interests are
incidentally benefited through the implementation of
a program involving primarily a public purpose does not
negate the public nature of the activity, Thomas v»
Daughters of the Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d
477 (1948).
Utah cases permitting public funds to be used
for development or construction where private benefit is
only incidental are clearly distinguishable in that all
the facilities involved were, indeed, public facilities,
to be used directly by the general public.

Tribe v. Salt

Lake City Corporation, 540 P.2d 499 (Utah, 1975) (public
parking facility); Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 2d
412, 375 P.2d 756 (1962) (Civic auditorium and arena);
Conder v. University of Utah, 123 Utah 182, 257 P.2d
367 (1953) (university dormitories); Spence v» Utah State
Agricultural College, 119 Utah 104, 225 P.2d 18 (1950)
(college construction); Thomas v. Daughters of the Pioneers,
114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477 (1948) (public historical museum).
Somewhat farther afield is Allen v. Tooele County, 21 Utah
2d 383, 445 P.2d 994 (1968) involving the creation of an

-12-
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industrial plant, but even this is distinguishable.

It was

to be paid for out of lease payments and benefit the local
economy generally.
In Tribe v.. Salt Lake City Corporation, supra,
the Court made special note of the fact that:
"The funds are being used by a
public body for a public purpose, i.e.,
to terminate urban blight; they are
not being given or loaned to a private
person,~nor are they used primarily for
private purposes." (Emphasis added.)
Contrast the public purpose indicated in these
cases with the purpose for the funds to be expended ui-,.3er
the Act in question for private housing.

Indeed, what could

possibly be more personal and private than a private home.
By no stretch of meaning can it be said that the Act is
primarily public in purpose with only incidental benefit
accruing to private interests.

The Act directly benefits

private interests both individuals and financial institutions,
by making available low interest, tax exempt funds for the
purchase, construction or rehabilitation of housing.

The

public benefit is incidental.
Consistent with this reasoning is the Michigan
case of In re Advisary Opinion, 380 Mich. 554, 158 N.W.2d
416 (1968), in which the Michigan Supreme Court considered
an act to create a state housing development authority.
The act was comparable to the Utah act now in question in
providing for the low interest loaning of money for low
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cost housina.

Under f-.h^ MiVVn'rra« r^~~4--: 4.,.4-1— - . _ .

could not be used for anything but public purposes without
a two-thirds vote of the legislative.

The court con-

cluded that:
"There can be no doubt that it is
a proper public purpose for the state
to concern itself with the housing
of its inhabitants-11 Id. 158 N.W.2dat 425.
A clear distinction was drawn between regulatory measures
such as building codes in na valid exercise of the police
power to insure that our people will live in safe and
sanitary dwellings" Id., 158 N.W. 2d at 424, or assisting
private enterprise by research, study and the disemination
of information, and the direct expenditure of public funds
to "rewire or fireproof every building in the state/'
Id*

The court held:
"The final light in which the
notion of public purpose must be
viewed has to do with the appropriation
of public funds to the state housing
development authority. As has been
already seen, Act 346 is itself an
appropriation bill, by reason of the
provisions of section 57 providing
$5,000 for the initial administration
of the law. Since the creation of
the state housing development authority
as an agency of state government
is a constitutional means to serve a
proper public purpose. . . an appropriation to be used purely for the
administration of the authority is an
appropriation for a public purpose.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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But the act contemplates appropriations to the housing development
fund, and to the capital reserve
sinking fund as well. The housing
development fund will be used to
make loans and advances to private
corporations. The capital reserve
sinking fund will be used to repay
bonds issued for the same purpose.
Appropriations to these funds do not
constitute appropriations for public
purposes." I<3. , 158 N.W- 2d at
429-430.
It is a noble purpose to improve housing,
but though it is prompted by humanitarian desires, it
is nonetheless primarily private in nature and to lend
state credit for such a purpose violates the Utah Constitution.
POINT II
THE UTAH HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY ACT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT CREATES STATE DEBT.
Article XIV Section 1 of the Utah Constitution
limits the amount of permissable State debt and specifies
the purposes for which the State may go into debt:
"To meet casual deficits or failures
in revenue, and for necessary expenditures for public purposes including
the erection of public buildings, and
for the payment of alf Territorial
indebtedness assumed by the State, the
State may contract debts, not exceeding in the aggragate at any one
time, an amount equal to one and onehalf per centum of the value of the
taxable property of the State, as shown
by the last assessment for State purposes,
previous to the incurring of such in-
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debtedness. But the State shall never
contract any indebtedness, except as
in the next Section provided E1. . .
to repel invasion, suppress insurrection,
or to defend the State in war. . .. . r
Art. XIV, Section 2], in excess of such
amount, and all moneys arising from
loans herein authorize!, shall be
applied solely to the purposes for which
they were obtained." (Emphasis added).
The same reasoning regarding the creation of
State debt by the Act, supra, point I.A., applies equally
to the application of this constitutional provision.
The contingent liabilities placed on the State Treasury
out of fiscal necessity and practical reality constitute
debt in violation of this constitutional provision.
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POINT III
THE UTAH HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY ACT IS •
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE T-iE NATURE, PURPOSE AND
BENEFIT OF THE AGENCY ARE PRIMARILY PRIVATE WHILE
IT PURPORTS TO ENJOY THE BENEFITS OF A PUBLIC ENTITY.
Several provisions of the Utah Constitution
make it abundantly clear that public and private
property must remain inviolately separate.

For

example, private property may not be taken "without
due process of law," Article I, section 7, and if it
is to be taken or used for "public use," "just
compensation" must be given, Article I, section 22.
In spite of this obvious separation in the law the
act totally confuses the distinction.
A.

The Act is Unconstitutional Because it

Creates a Private Corporation by Special Legislation.
Article XII, section 1 provides:
"Corporations may be
formed under general laws, but
shall not be created by special
acts....
Because the primary purposes and benefits of the Utah
Housing Finance Agency are private, it cannot be a
public entity and must therefore be a private
corporation (see discussion on the private nature of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

i

the Agency's purposes, supra, point I.B.).

The Agency

exists for*an indefinite period of time, may own
property, and may sue and be sued, as any other corporate
entity.

Yet contrary to the above constitutional

provision it has been created by a special act.
B.

The Act is Unconstitutional Because it

Exempts Private Property From Taxation*
Article XIII of Utah's Constitution requires
all non-ex --apt property to be taxed, and provides, in
part:
"Section 2. All tangible
property in the state, not exempt
under the laws of the United
States, or under this Constitution,
Shall be taxed in proportion to its
value. . .
Section 3. The Legislature
shall provide by law a uniform and
equal rate of assessment and taxation on all tangible property in the
state . . . so that every person and
corporation shall pay a tax in
proportion to the value of his, her,
or its tangible property. . .
Section 10. All corporations
or persons in this Stater or doing
business herein, shall be subject to
taxation for State, County, School,
Municipal or other purposes, on the
real and personal property owned
or used by them within the Territorial
limits of the authority levying the
tax."
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The Act provides that the Agency property
exempt from taxation.

Section 63-44a~16.

i

Because the

pruposes and benefits of the Agency are primarily
private, see I.B., supra, and the Agency is essentially
a private corporation, see III.A., supra, it is
unconstitutional to grant such tax exemption.
POINT IV
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE UTAH HOUSING
FINANCE AGENCY ACT SERVES A LEGITIMATE PUBLIC PURPOSE
RATHER THAN PRIVATE INTERESTS, IT IS NEVERTHELESS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE SUCH PURPOSES WOULD BE LOCAL IN
NATURE AND THE ACT DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS REGARDING MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

.

The Utah Constitution clearly requires that
the Legislature allow local problems to be handled
locally to the extent possible and such legislation
must have general and uniform application.

Article XI,

section 5, emphasizes that municipal problems are to be
handled by municipal corporations created by general laws
and suggests the extensive scope of municipal power and
authority including taxing, borrowing, issuing bonds,
providing sanitary, police and similar regulations and
to furnish generally all local public services, facilities,
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and improvements.

It reads, in part:

"Corporations for municipal
purposes shall not be created by
special laws. The legislature by
general laws shall provide for the
incorporation, organization and
classification of cities and towns
•

• •

Each city forming its charter
under this section shall have, and
is hereby granted, the authority to
exercise all powers relating to
municipal affairs, and to adopt and
enforce v/ithin its limits, local police,
sanitary and similar regulations not
in conflict with the general law. . .
The power to be conferred upon
the cities by this section shall include
the following:
(a) To levy, assess and collect
taxes and borrow money, within the limits
prescribed by general law, and to levy
and collect special assessments for
benefits conferred.
(b) To furnish all local public
services . . . to acquire by•condemnation, or otherwise, within or without
the corporate limits, property necessary
for any such purposes, subject to restrictions imposed by general law for the
protection of other communities . . .
(c) To make local public improvements and to acquire by condemnation,
or otherwise, property within its
corporate limits necessary for such
improvements; and also to acquire an
excess over than [that] needed for any
such improvement and to sell or lease
such excess property with restrictions,
in order to protect and preserve the
improvement.
(d) To issue and sell bonds on the
security of any such excess property. . .
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See also Article I, section 24, and Article VI,
section 26•

.

Article VI, section 28, explicitly states:
"The Legislature shall not
delegate to any special commission,
private corporation or association,
any power to make, supervise or
interfere with any municipal
improvements, money, property, or
effects, whether held in trust or
otherwise, to levy taxes, to select
a capitol site, or to perform any
municipal functions."
Article XIII, section 5 provides:
"The Legislature shall not impose
taxes for the purpose of any county,
city, town or other municipal corporation, but may, by law, vest in the
corporate authorities thereof,
respectively, the power to assess and
collect taxes for all purposes of such
corporation."
It is clear that to whatever extent there are
local problems of an inadequate supply of decent,
safe,

sanitary housing for persons of low or moderate

income, and to whatever extent it is constitutional for
a governmental entity to make funds available directly
to private individuals to remedy such problem, that
function not only may be left to municipalities, but
pursuant to the Constitution, it must be left to
municipalities.

In creating a special agency to deal
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with such problems in a statewide basis by the partial
use of state tax dollars, the Act circumvents the clear
intent of the Constitution.
POINT V
THE UTAH HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT CONSTITUTES AN IMPROPER DELEGATION
OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY.
The Utah Constitution provides for the separation of the legislative, executive and judicial functions
of government, Article V, section 1, and vests the
legislative power in the senate, house, and people,
Article VI, section 1.

It is well recognized that the

legislature may not delegate this law-making power to
administrative agencies, State v. Goss, 79 Utah 599,
11 P.2d 340 (1932).

The legislature must set clearly

defined guidelines for the scope, purpose and application
of the legislation to enable an administrative agency to
function its authority.

See, for example, Clayton v.

Bennett, 5 Utah 2d 152, 298 P.2d 531 (1956).
The Act is not "complete in itself,11 leaving
many loose ends for the agency to try to tie without the
benefit of a clearly defined policy or guideline.

For

example, the Act speaks in terms of "low and moderate
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income persons" without any defining of those terms
either specifically or by reference to a statistical
"average" income, or any other clearly defined guideline
to indicate who would be eligible for such funds.
Section 63~44a~3(6).

Furthermore, the criteria for

such "low and moderate income person" may vary depending
on the locality within which he dwells (see discussion
on the local nature of•the problem under point IV, supra).
The Act purports to confer upon the agency power
to deal with the problem of the inadequate supply of "safe"
and "sanitary" housing without any guidance as to the
scope and nature of that authority.

It appears the agency

would have unbridled power to define these terms, with
large sums of money in the balance, without regard to
local building codes, health regulations, or other local
restrictions (see discussion on the local nature of the
problem under Point IV, supra).
• In light of such serious open-ended questions,
the Act is not complete in itself and thus a great deal
of law-making remains in the hands of an administrative
agency.

Such power in this agency constitutes an improper

delegation of legislative authority in violtion of the
Constitution.
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POINT VI
THE UTAH HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY ACT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT CREATES AN IRREVOCABLE
FRANCHISE, PRIVILEGE OR IMMUNITY.
Article I, section 23, prohibits that:

"No

law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise,
privilege or immunity.11

The purpose of such a provision

is to avoid the problem of one legislature binding the
actions, and therefore limiting the power, of a subsequent
legislature.

Thomas v. Daughters of the Utah Pioneers,

supra*
The Act provides that the state shall not limit
or alter the rights granted the agency to fulfill its
contracts or impair the rights of bondholders.
63-44a-14.

Section

Such provision goes beyond the requirement •;;.,

that contract rights may not be constitutionally impaired.
This provision, by its terms, purports to limit any
future legislature in what it may do in altering agency
power or in permitting alteration of agreements with bondholders, even by mutual agreement on agreeable terms.
The fact that eventually time will eliminate all
such bonded indebtedness does not alter the fact that
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such benefits, for a time, are in fact irrevocable.
The agency has perpetual existence, Section 63-44a-9,
and the Act seems to permit various bonds to be issued
over time.

Inasmuch as the bonded indebtedness -could

be created over an indefinite period of time, the
irrevocability likewise would extend over a period of
time.

But even an attempt to bind a future legislature

even one year hence would be, and is, to that extent,
unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
The Utah Housing Finance Agency Act violates
numerous provisions of the Utah Constitution.

It

creates a state debt and lends state credit to private
undertakings.

Through special legislation it infringes

on uniquely municipal functions.

It improperly dele-

gates legislative authority to an administrative
agency and grants an irrevocable franchise, privilege
or immunity.

Appellants submit that the decision of

the lower court should be reversed.

The act should

be declared unconstitutionl and the defendants should
be relieved of any requirement of complying therewith
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or of approving the dispers

[ of funds in aid

thereof.
Respectfully submitted,
ROLKRT B. HANSEN
Att >rney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellants
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